In April we published the investigation related to the fake “insurance certificates” of the Russian shadow fleet and the related “German company” “Seaguard P&I,” connected with such persons as Tahsin Shehadeh from the “Syrian Chamber of Shipping” with relevant illegal Crimea-related activities.
In the framework of our investigations’ results, the relevant information was sent by us to the authorized international bodies and associations in the maritime industry area, as well as to the national maritime administrations, legal enforcement structures, and sanctions units of the democratic jurisdictions.
Our submissions stressed that it is obvious that the scam with obviously fake “certificates” from the non-existent “insurance” structure “Seaguard P&I” is not the initiative of an individual shipowner and cannot be explained by purely commercial, albeit illegal, interests.
Most likely, at the current stage, tankers of the shadow fleet are becoming toxic for the absolute majority of marine insurance P&I clubs, among other things, due to the risks of falling under secondary sanctions for receiving insurance funds or making insurance payments. At the same time, if Russia has its own or partner classification structures that can still provide the shadow fleet with technical documents without risking financial liability, then there are simply no P&I clubs controlled by Russia.
Thus, it is likely that the top managers of the shadow fleet had the idea to create, with the assistance of Syrian maritime figures and Kremlin lobbyists in Germany, a completely fake “company,” the sole function of which would be to imitate “ship insurance.”
Our submission added that it is obvious that the fake “insurance” of a tanker makes all subsequent documents issued for the vessel, both technical and commercial, at least dubious. It is also obvious that the imitation of the “insurance” of a tanker grossly violates the requirements of the MARPOL convention in terms of the lack of coverage of the risks of marine pollution by oil and grossly violates the demands of the MLC convention in the format of failure to provide insurance for accidents and other challenges for crew members.
So fake “insurance” of the Russian tanker fleet creates strong challenges against maritime security, safety, the environment, and seafarers’ rights, and we asked in our submissions all bodies and officials whom it concerns to take this submission into account for all their current activities.
Our submission stressed that the associations of shipowners, of seafarers, of P&I clubs, as well as national maritime and flag administrations, international bodies, and memorandums of understanding, must develop effective reaction mechanisms against fake “insurance” of the tanker fleet.
We got some effective responses on our submissions already, and on May 6, the European Commission’s Department General for Financial Stability, Financial Services, and Capital Markets (FISMA) informed us officially that our input on the issue of fraudulent insurance concerning a number of Russia-related tankers is very valuable to inform the European Union shadow fleet designations.
FISMA informed us additionally that the European Union remains unswerving in its resolve to fight the shadow fleet, as notably shown by the more than 630 vessel designations achieved so far and the most recent ones adopted under the April 2026 twentieth sanctions package; our cooperation with the European Commission on that issue will be continued.
