In occupied Sevastopol, the clan squabble we previously described continues in the entourage of the city auleiter, Mikhail Razvozhaev. And its latest “honorary victim” has become collaborator Yuri Klepche, the former “Director of the department for governor and government affairs.”
Klepche held this “position” since May 2023, and previously, he was listed as the “first deputy” in the same “department.”
Now this figure has been accused of “embezzlement, abuse of office, and negligence,” but has been placed, through a “decision” of the fake “Nakhimov district court,” under “vegetarian” “house arrest.”
The current “accusation” centers on “inflated contracts for installing security alarms in government buildings,” and “negligence in concluding a building lease contract for the department of health,” allegedly concluded through acquaintances.
What’s notable about this story isn’t so much Klepche’s obvious closeness to the gauleiter,
but rather the fact that back in January, Mikhail Razvozhaev transferred Klepche to “manage the state-owned company” “Sevastopolstroyproekt”, a previously described shell company for the “governor’s group” to exploit millions of dollars in the “federal program.”
Let us recall that Razvozhaev’s “deputy,” Svetlana Pirogova, previously escalated the confrontation with competing groups by transferring her relative to Sevastopol as the “general director” of that very same “Sevastopolstroyproekt”. And after Klepche’s “appointment,” the same organization received over 2.4 billion rubles for the “reconstruction of the Historical Boulevard.”
Moreover, it’s most noteworthy that Klepche hasn’t been fully “registered” at “Sevastopolstroyproekt” in the past month, and his transfer, as rumored in the corridors of the “city government,” was “planned” and in no way connected to the current “criminal prosecution.”
Furthermore, Razvozzhaev himself hasn’t publicly commented on the situation with Klepche since the punitive authorities announced the “criminal case,” which differs from previous situations, when repressions against yet another “scapegoat” occurred with his knowledge.
Thus, the inter-clan struggle that has intensified in the corridors of Sevastopol’s “powers” since 2024, clearly manifested in a series of “nationalizations” in 2025 and further developed in the public “exchange of compromising information,” has now “opened the door” for various Kremlin punitive structures in search of lucrative targets for “defatting.”
Whether these turbulences will lead to the Kremlin replacing Razvozzhaev himself remains unclear, since Moscow has clearly decided not to replace the “key talking heads” in the occupied territories “until the end of the war.”
