Just yesterday we wrote about the “fateful visit” to the occupied peninsula of the “shot down pilot” of the Russian special services Nikolai Patrushev, who was sent in August, after 16 years in the chair of the secretary of the security council of the aggressor, into “honorable retirement” as the head of the Russian Marine board.
As another conspiracy theory from Patrushev, the aggressor’s “Crimean” propaganda began to broadcast “revelations” about the alleged “US plans to “revise the Montreux Convention” and “NATO’s invasion of the Black Sea from the Danube” as “Anglo-Saxon policy”.
We wrote that the main practical goal of these “warnings” from Patrushev is to “knock out” through propaganda new militaristic orders from the Kremlin for “Crimean shipbuilding”.
However, while they are busy mastering billions in a scam from the daughter of the infamous Sergei Shoigu on the “construction of sixteen excursion catamarans”, and the aggressor may not have an extra trillion for shipbuilding, as well as the necessary technologies, then in the propaganda dimension, the “Crimean” media predictably began to talk about the “treachery of the Turks on the Bosphorus” and “a strike to Danube”.
And if on the issue of the “Turkish Straits” these “sharks of the pen” did not dare to go beyond the traditional fabrications about “geopolitics”, then regarding the main European river they voiced the intentions of the aggressor to “block the Danube”, declaring that “one ship at the bottom of the Danube – and that’s it”.
Obviously, such “and that’s it” is physically impossible to do exclusively on the Ukrainian section of the Danube Delta, which has not only at least two other, full-fledged ship passages to the sea in the delta through Romania, but also a shipping channel to Constanta, which is completely controlled by the Romanians.
Also, the current policy of missile and drone terror of the Kremlin in three years of a large-scale war has not led to the sinking of a single ship on the Danube fairways, despite all the efforts of Russian terrorists. In addition, the probability of a direct missile strike by the Russians on the Danube on the territory of Romania or Bulgaria remains low due to the obvious military and political consequences.
Therefore, it is possible that the Russians could sink a vessel in the fairway or create other obstacles to Danube shipping in the form of a blown-up bridge or lock by carrying out a “classic” terrorist act.
This activity of the aggressor’s special services is predictable even after the recent exclusion of Russia from the Danube Commission, which was extremely painful for aggressor’s “geopolitics”.
Therefore, this terrorist blackmail can be considered both as a form of pressure on the Danube NATO and EU countries, and as a “trial balloon” for the purpose of monitoring the response to such “initiatives” from the authorities of Romania or Bulgaria.
Obviously, for such terrorist activity, the aggressor will be able to use its active “fifth column” in the transport structures of Hungary, Serbia or Slovakia.
