The scale of the current environmental disaster in the Black Sea, caused by the activities of the Russian tanker fleet, is exceptional.
The environmental disaster began after the tanker “Volgoneft-212” sank near the Kerch Strait on December 15, 2024, and the tanker “Volgoneft-239” broke apart and its bow sank, and its stern “dropped anchor” on the Caucasian coast near Temryuk.
The two tankers carried more than 8 thousand tons of fuel oil, and it can now be predicted, that Russian-controlled structures may eventually pump out some of the fuel oil from the stern of “Volgoneft-239”. The remaining parts of the two tankers are at the bottom and their very lifting poses risks of further fuel oil leakage. A month after the disaster, several thousand tons of fuel oil had already leaked from these wreckages.
For the practically closed water area of the Black and Azov Seas, whose ecosystems are already in a very negative state, the consequences of this accident are fundamental and will manifest themselves throughout the next decade. Thick fuel oil has accumulated in the water layers, and sea currents have already spread the pollution to all sea waters from the coast of Georgia to the northern coast of Azov and to the shelf of the northern part of the Black Sea.
Contact with fuel oil leads to the death of small marine biota, mollusks and crustaceans, as well as fish, birds and cetaceans. In addition, fuel oil accumulates in plankton and fish and is further distributed throughout the marine food chain. Near the epicenter of the disaster are wetlands of global importance, cetacean breeding grounds and key fish spawning routes.
The accumulation of fuel oil on the seabed also poses a threat, in particular to algal fields on the shelf, such as phyllophorous fields, which are key places for self-cleaning of the sea and fish reproduction. All these consequences are hidden and at present it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of damage, but according to the most conservative estimates it is very significant.
In addition, the massive simultaneous death of marine biota outside the “biological schedules” poses risks to the balance of the hydrogen sulfide layer in the Black Sea, which has already entered the “turbulence zone” due to global warming and a gradual increase in sea water temperature.
For the coast, fuel oil thrown out by the sea poses a significant threat, both to ecosystems and to recreational potential. At the same time, sandy or soil beaches contaminated with fuel oil are “cleaned” in Crimea by the occupiers by physically collecting and removing thousands of tons of mass, which, in turn, will lead to contamination of its storage sites, sites near Shcholkino and at the Sevastopol city landfill, and the corresponding soils, watercourses and groundwater.
And mechanical removal of sand not only destroys the recreational potential of beaches, but also significantly increases coastal abrasive processes. And where the coast is rocky or pebbly, no one can collect fuel oil from the stone surface at all: the aggressor does not have the appropriate technologies.
Currently, the main sources of information about the disaster are satellite images and information on social networks, in particular photo and video recordings. Information from the aggressor-controlled “media” and the occupiers’ “officials” is carefully censored by them in the general context of a supposedly “safe tourist Crimea”.
In fact, the more or less true circumstances are what the aggressor is unable to hide: the facts of the death of cetaceans and birds and examples of mass fish kills, as was the case with the anchovy on January 15 in the Sevastopol bays.
But these facts are only a small element of the tragedy, since the bulk of fish, birds and cetaceans die in the open sea and a small part of them reach the shore. Also characteristic is the statistics of “rescued” birds, which after being collected on the shore and “cleaned”, still die en masse from the irreversible damage they have received.
According to various indicators, up to 60-80 % of the several thousand contaminated birds found in Crimea still die after “rescue”.
Earlier, in November 2007, a similar disaster, but on a smaller scale, occurred in the Kerch Strait with the Russian tanker “Volgoneft-139” with 4 thousand tons of fuel oil on board.
But then, primarily due to the active activities of the Ukrainian authorities, the consequences of the disaster were minimized from the very beginning, approximately 1.6 thousand tons of fuel oil fell into the sea, which was then promptly collected, and by the end of 2007, most of the pollution had been eliminated. But even that previous catastrophe, which was much smaller in terms of pollution geography, led to a significant deterioration of the environmental situation in the Kerch Strait, which was noticeable until the beginning of the occupation of Crimea.
In general, the “shadow fleet” term refers to large-tonnage tankers, controlled by , that transport hydrocarbons from Russian ports in the Baltic, Arctic and Far East, as well as from Novorossiysk.
The environmental risks from its operation are associated with the general negligence of the Russian authorities and shipowners, who are least concerned about environmental issues. The technical condition of large-tonnage tankers in Russia should theoretically be certified by classification societies, and compensation for damage should be guaranteed by insurers.
But the “shadow fleet” is technically controlled either by the state-owned “Russian Maritime Register of Shipping” or by “junk” private technical companies; they will knowingly not detect, let alone record, any problems on tankers that would interfere with their continued operation by the Russian oil business.
The falsity of the “Russian Register” documents was, among other things, confirmed by their mass uncontrolled issuance by the aggressor to ships and port infrastructure in the occupied Crimea since 2014.
Russian insurers issue their services exclusively nominally; no payments after accidents, in particular regarding compensation for environmental damage, cannot be expected from them, which, by the way, was confirmed by the accident in 2007, when the Russian insurers of the ships, sank in the Kerch Strait, “suddenly went bankrupt.”
But the currently lost “Volgoneft” tankers are not large-tonnage, they are a kind of part of the Russian oil empire, and transport oil products on the inland waterways of Russia, as well as on the Danube, the Baltic, the Caspian, the Azov, the Black and the Mediterranean seas.
The difference between tankers of the “Volgoneft” type lies in their fundamental purpose not for sea, but for inland waterways, for which, in fact, they were massively built in Soviet times. But in the last 30 years, Russia has mercilessly exploited this “inherited” fleet, small in tonnage, but significant in number, for sea transportation.
The “Volgoneft” type oil tankers include vessels of five projects: “550” and the similar “558”, “550A”, “1577” and “630”, they were built from 1963 to 1996 at the Volgograd Shipyard, as well as at two Bulgarian enterprises, “Ivan Dimitrov” in Ruse and “Georgi Dimitrov” in Varna. “Volgoneft” became the most mass-produced series of small tankers, originally intended for transportation of crude oil and oil products in the USSR, primarily along the river systems of the Volga, Don, northern rivers of the European part of Russia and the canals and lakes connecting them, but not for maritime operations.
All vessels of the “Volgoneft” project were united by a German lead engine from the East German concern “SKL” (VEB “Karl Liebknecht”) 8NVD48AU, replaced in the last project “630” with a more powerful 8NVDS-48AU. The fact that from the very beginning the “Volgoneft” tankers were intended for inland shipping was emphasized by their control over the “Russian River Register”, where they were of the O-PR class and later M-PR. All “reconstructions” of those tankers committed in XXI century are out of standards of maritime safety and security.
As of end of 2024, at least 53 of the 71 built Project “1557” vessels, 51 of the 65 Project “550A” tankers, 13 of the 25 Project “550” vessels, 13 of the 36 Project “558” tankers and all nine tankers of the “youngest” Project “630” physically exist.
The absolute, if not complete majority of them are owned by Russian beneficiaries, and with extremely rare exceptions, they are still listed under the Russian flag. However, in real operation, the aggressor has significantly fewer vessels of this type: in addition to extreme decrepitude, the obvious problem for Russian owners is the replacement or repair of the main engine.
Thus, in 2025, Russia can continue to exploit up to 80 “surviving” “Volgonefts” for the purposes of its oil complex, of which at least 15-20 will be actively used by the Russian invaders in Azov-Black Sea shipping. It creates huge challenges for maritime safety, security and for maritime environment.
At the same time, the classifier of these vessels is primarily the “Russian Classification Society”, the former “Russian River Register”, which maximally tolerates the negative safety status of tankers, the bulk of which was built before 1980.
It is noteworthy that of the approximately 80 tankers of this type that remain in active operation by the aggressor, a significant part has been in long-term storage, repairs, “re-equipment”, etc., over the past decade, because even their physical capacity for transportation, even in a risky state, must be constantly “maintained”.
Since the 1990s, Russia, in its pursuit of “easy petrodollars”, has not paid attention to the need to update its small-tonnage tanker fleet, and now we are observing the sad consequences of such inaction. At the same time, the state-owned oil companies of the Russian Federation constantly allocate billions of dollars for the transportation of petroleum products to the beneficiaries of vessels of the “Volgoneft” type, without worrying about the condition of these tankers.
The next accidents with tankers of the “Volgoneft” type are a matter of time, since their technical condition is critical. At the same time, the risks exist not only for the water areas of the Danube, Baltic, Black and Azov Seas or the Caspian Sea, where dozens of vessels of this type were seen in operation in 2024, but also for the water areas of the Volga, Don or Neva, which will carry the consequences of the accidents into international waters.
In addition to two large-scale accidents near the Kerch Strait in 2007 and 2024, many incidents with tankers of the “Volgoneft” type were observed in the 21st century, both due to their technical condition and the “human factor”, some of which miraculously did not lead to a large-scale leak of oil products.
As already mentioned, the main risks for the almost closed Black Sea are mass deaths of wildlife, accumulation of oil products in food chains, destruction of algal beds, and changes in the hydrogen sulfide layer. Also obvious are the negative consequences for the recreational potential of the coast. These consequences threaten both Ukraine and Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Georgia, with the greatest risks if, for example, a disaster occurs in the Black Sea straits.
Russian maritime policy and illegal actions directly caused the catastrophe of “Volgoneft-212” and “Volgoneft-239” near Kerch Strait on December 15, 2024, and it brutally violated the relevant human rights of Crimean population, including Indigenous Crimea Tatar People, as right to development, right to health, right to food and water, violated the local entities collective interests, violated principles of environmentally sound management, adequate housing, democratic and equitable international order and international solidarity.
The general norm “the polluter pays” applies in international law. Russia as a state bears full responsibility for the consequences of the disaster on December 15, since it occurred due to inadequate actions and inaction of the Russian classification society, cargo owners, insurers and shipowners, who allowed dangerous tankers to go to sea with cargo, and due to the actions of port operators and port captains, who then prohibited tankers from returning to port in stormy weather, despite the documented requests of their captains.
Russia, as an occupying state, also bears full responsibility for liquidation of consequences of the disaster in Crimea, the coast of Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions and in the sea areas adjacent to the occupied territories. The mechanisms of compensation are determined by those who will demand it: it may be the authorities of Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, etc.
The issue of compensation to other entities, for example, regions, territorial communities, individual legal entities, is complicated by the occupation by Russia of the coastal territories of Ukraine, which have suffered the most from pollution.
In addition, according to Ukrainian legislation, the collector in relevant cases is primarily the state, but there are interesting prospects for the indigenous Crimean Tatar people to put forward relevant demands, within the framework of current legislation and international standards, through their representative institutions.
As of January 2024, the Ministry of Ecology of Ukraine is noticeably active in determining the scale of damage and initiating appropriate cooperation with Bulgaria and Romania, and in international institutions.
Time will tell whether relevant proceedings, including criminal ones, will be initiated in the national jurisdictions of the Black Sea states.
The damage, caused by the consequences of the disaster to Ukraine and other states should, as a result of international proceedings, be compensated by Russia as a state, and not by specific individuals or legal entities. However, if criminal proceedings are initiated in the jurisdiction of Ukraine, the liability of the guilty legal entities and individuals may also be established there.
The main global agreement on the marine environment is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, at the same time, one should not forget about Ukraine’s previous, rather unsuccessful, attempt to bring a case against Russia under this Сonvention regarding violationsб caused by Russian aggression since 2014, in particular in the dimension of the marine environment. Then, the relevant substantively justified Ukrainian claims were rejected by arbitration due to the alleged “lack of jurisdiction”.
If the mechanisms of the 1982 Convention are to be used in the future, careful preparation and appropriate “work on mistakes” should be carried out.
The basic document in this area is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) of 1991, but Russia has not ratified it, despite three decades of promises to the UN. Similarly, Russia is not a party to the Agreement on the Conservation of Afro-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds of 1995 and the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) of 1998. Therefore, Ukraine, as a party to these agreements, has limited opportunities to discuss the situation in the relevant convention bodies, which, however, should be tried to use.
A similar situation, in terms of marine mammals, has developed with regard to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals of 1979 and the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area of 1996. At the same time, Russia, like Ukraine, is a party to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992, and therefore a dispute is possible about the consequences of Russia’s exploitation of the Kerch Strait as such a watercourse. However, careful preparation is required to comply with the requirements of jurisdiction in this situation.
In measuring damage to birds, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), 1971, ratified by Russia, can be used. Similarly, with regard to damage to rare species, the mechanisms of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which is binding on Russia, should be used.
Promising are international disputes regarding Russia’s violation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the International Convention on Civil Liability for Marine Oil Pollution of 1969, the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) of 1972, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation of 1990, which are binding on the aggressor, because they were ratified by the USSR.
The processes regarding these conventions, approved under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), should take place within the framework of the IMO procedures.
The mechanisms of the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution are equally important, and its violation by Russia should be submitted to the Black Sea Commission for consideration. In addition, the issue of restrictions on the admission of vessels of the “Volgoneft” type should be considered by the memoranda of understanding on Port State Control and by the Danube Commission, despite Russia’s non-participation in majority of these structures.
Measures can be applied to vessels entering ports or using passage in the exclusive territorial sea and straits. They can include a ban on passage and entry into the port, in particular for environmental and navigational safety reasons; the “Volganeft” category of tankers is a classic example of the possibility of such restrictions.
Additional in-depth control can also be introduced in the form of a survey of the condition of the vessel or checks of its documents. The criteria for such control can be the risky class of the vessel, the use of a certain flag, for example, Russian, and the presence on the vessel of classification or insurance documents issued by a risky company, for example, the “Russian Maritime Register of Shipping” or the “Russian Classification Society”.
The coastal state may generally declare non-recognition of the relevant classification and insurance documents, which will significantly complicate the navigation of Russian tankers.
A separate block should be considered the relevant decisions or recommendations of the IMO, the Danube Commission and memoranda of understanding on Port State Control, which coastal states must take into account.
The sanctions policy may be broader and cover not only vessels, their operators, shipowners and owners, insurance and classification companies, but also cargo-owning companies, as well as intermediaries.
Restrictions on passage through the territorial sea and in exclusive economic zones will significantly complicate the transit of the Russian tanker fleet in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, as well as in the Baltic. This will significantly reduce the corresponding risks to the ecology of these most vulnerable seas.
Regarding the Baltic, the beginning of such restrictions can already be observed, in terms of the active activities of the authorities of Estonia, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany, in particular under the auspices of NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force, although the main prerequisite for their actions was not environmental challenges, but sabotage of underwater infrastructure by Russian tankers.
At the same time, the position of Turkey will play a key role in the export of Russian oil from the Black Sea ports, to influence which decisions of international structures are obviously needed. The aggressor’s shipping in the Arctic and the Far East will be less dependent on such restrictions, where decisions of the authorities of Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore may play a certain role.
As the experience of the last month of inspections in the Baltic, carried out by the Finnish and Estonian services, shows, such activities can have a significant impact on the activities of the Russian tanker fleet, protecting the safety of shipping and the environment. In the Black Sea, such inspections can be carried out by Turkey in the straits, but at the same time, it is difficult to expect such unilateral actions from its current authorities there, however, we could be wrong in such forecast.
But such inspections can be carried out in their own territorial seas and the exclusive economic zone of the Mediterranean by Spain, Italy and Malta.
Sanction mechanisms are effective when they are directed at companies that are difficult to quickly transform, so their main subject should be powerful shipowners and tanker operators, classification and insurance companies. Restrictions on the activities of the Russian tanker fleet and strengthening of relevant inspections are within the competence of the IMO, the Danube Commission and the memoranda of understanding on Port State Control, which should be constantly worked on.
Unfortunately, there is no active work on the consequences of the disaster in the Kerch Strait from the International Crimea Platform, although such events are directly included in its mandate, as it was noted earlier, the reasons should be sought in the incomplete institutionalization of both the Platform and its Expert Network.
The role of civil society and the academic environment in countering the consequences of environmental disasters and other risks in the field of activity of the Russian tanker fleet is potentially of exceptional importance and multi-layered dimension.
This includes the collection of primary information about events, in particular in social networks, through the analysis of marine search resources and satellite data, and modeling of situations, and the publication and dissemination of the information received.
It also includes direct communication with all international intergovernmental structures that have a mandate in the field of maritime shipping, the environment and sustainable development, as well as with government agencies and transnational corporations, in particular in the sanctions dimension and regarding the introduction of administrative measures.
For example, our Association, following the consequences of the December 15 disaster, sent more than 200 appeals to relevant external structures in January 2025, and today we can note the response to them from a number of intergovernmental organizations, including the IMO and from a certain number of national administrations of states in the field of sanctions and shipping safety.
If we do not touch on the topic of interstate proceedings and disputes regarding the establishment of conventional violations by Russia and the corresponding compensation, the priority should be the reaction of specialized international structures: the IMO, its divisions, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Danube Commission, the Black Sea Commission, and from the working groups and special rapporteurs of the UN Office in Geneva.
The adoption of relevant resolutions would allow for increased coordination among states to protect the safety of the marine environment and shipping from challenges posed by the Russian tanker fleet.
Special attention for that issue must be paid to illegal activities of Russian classification societies such as “Russian Maritime Register of Shipping” and “Russian Classification Society”, former “Russian River Register”. It was the “Russian River Register” that, since 2014, provided criminal “classification supervision” of merchant fleet vessels, port infrastructure, and property of the Ukraine’s “Chornomornaftogaz” state joint-stock company seized in the temporarily occupied Crimea.
Currently, the “Russian Classification Society” declares that it has an illegal “Crimean branch” with a “geographic area of activity” in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, Sevastopol and Kherson region.
Its illegal “branch office and the Sevastopol site” are located in Sevastopol, 25 Bastionna Street 4-a, and its illegal “Kerch site” is located in Kerch at 1-A Miroshnyka Street, room 48. In addition, the Dono-Kuban branch of the “Russian Classification Society” illegally declared as including the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the “geographic area of activity”.
At the same time, at least until 2022, active attempts of Russia to provocatively and illegally promote the activities of the “Russian River Register” were observed in the Danube Commission, in the Black Sea Port State Control Memorandum, in the Water Transport Committee of the UN European Economic Commission and in the IMO. And now exactly the “Russian Classification Society”, former “Russian River Register”, that supervised both “Volgoneft-212” and “Volgoneft-239” as allegedly safe and secure vessels, bear a huge part of responsibility for their catastrophe near Kerch Strait on December 15, 2024.
Also, as it was mentioned already, all vessels of the “Volgoneft” project are extremely dangerous for maritime shipping, safety, security and environment, so their exploitation must be banned as in high seas, so in territorial sea, exclusive zones and straits of all maritime states.
Activity of bodies and officials of Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is also essencial for counteraction those risks for maritime security and ecology. In January, 2025 our Associaiton urgently asked the Organisation by special submission to make special statement on situation with ecologic catastrophe started after catastrophe of “Volgoneft-212” and “Volgoneft-239” near Kerch Strait on December 15, 2024.
Professor Borys Babin, PhD Andrii Cvaliuk, PhD Eduard Pleshko, PhD Olexii Plotnikov, experts of the Association of Reintegration of Crimea




