The illegal bridge across the Kerch Strait was the “special pride” of the Kremlin, because it is the “only artery” that illegally connects the occupied Crimea with the the aggressor state.
From the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the “Crimean Bridge” immediately became the subject of sharp political statements from both sides. Ukraine viewed it as a potential target of strategic importance, because through the occupied peninsula the aggressor brought equipment and manpower to the newly occupied Ukrainian territories.
For the collaborators, this object was also “important” in view of the organization of illegal trade in the respective commercial interests. For the Kremlin, the bridge almost immediately became an object of intimidation of Ukraine, because any attempts to attack it, according to the Kremlin leadership, should be considered as an “attack on Russia”. When the world learned about the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” on the morning of October 8, it became obvious that this event would have significant consequences.
The situation was analyzed by experts of Association of Reintegration of Crimea.
Almost immediately after the explosion, the aggressor’s special services accused Ukrainian military intelligence officers and the head of the relevant structure. Within a few days, the FSB of Russia even provided the media with a “scheme” of the organization of the explosion. It was also stated by the Russian punishers that they had already detained the “involved”, such as “5 citizens of Russia, 3 citizens of Ukraine and 3 citizens of Armenia”.
As stated by the Russian penal structures, the explosive device was allegedly “camouflaged in rolls with polyethylene film on 22 pallets, with a total weight of 22 tons”. Apparently, this “cargo went from Odessa to a Bulgarian port, then to Georgia, and finally to Armenia”, where it was supposedly “cleared by customs”. Then, the FSB declared, from here the “cargo according to the documents” was apparently “directed to the Crimea” [1].
The first thing that comes to mind is the unprecedented “efficiency” of the aggressor’s special services in the fake “investigation of a terrorist act”, detailing all the details. This happens when the “investigators” themselves have a plan developed in advance, which is implemented step by step and has a corresponding goal. We will return to the latter a little later, but we all remember that a significant number of high-profile crimes and terrorist attacks in Russia itself were “investigated” by the special services according to approximately the same scheme. For example, explosions in residential buildings in Moscow were written off as attacks by Chechen militants, and murders of opposition politicians – as banal robbery.
There is also the question of how the “truck with explosives” could get onto the bridge, which is supposedly “very carefully guarded”. According to the aggressor’s statements, “a security system is installed and used on the bridge, which provides for the inspection of all trucks at the ST-6035 stationary inspection and maintenance radio-technical complex”. Such an “inspection” was supposed to be carried out by the departmental security department of the aggressor’s Ministry of Transport [2].
It is logical that under the conditions of war, such measures only intensify, then it is not at all clear how 22 tons of explosives can freely travel to such an important infrastructural object for the aggressor’s criminal intentions. Probably, this is possible only in the case when this cargo is deliberately passed without inspection, according to a previous instruction.
Nevertheless, as a result of the damage to the “Crimean Bridge”, the Russian occupiers temporarily reduced the possibility of criminally transferring weapons and equipment to the occupied Crimea. Also, the explosion essentially destroyed the logistics of the collaborators [3]. Also, after the explosion, the Russian occupiers significantly increased control over the movement of people on the peninsula itself, and this also increased the humanitarian crisis in the occupied Crimea [4].
The Russian invaders have already officially announced that it will be possible to completely repair the bridge only by the end of 2023, although the self-proclaimed “head of Crimea” Serhii Aksyonov initially stated that “repairs will be completed within 2-3 months” [5]. The explosion on the bridge and the “progress of repair work” immediately began to be covered by top Russian propagandists, and commented by the highest officials of the aggressor, who arranged “selfie tours” at the object [6].
The purpose of such excitement is to show that the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” is allegedly “exclusively beneficial to Ukraine” and Russia “is a victim”. However, this is only a clear, propaganda goal, behind which lies the Kremlin’s true desires. It’s funny, but it wasn’t Ukrainian politicians who started talking about her, but Putin’s proven “evil friend” – Oleksandr Lukashenko.
In particular, in his statement, he noted that Russia’s massive missile attacks on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which began on October 10, are, as it were, “a response to the destruction of the Crimean Bridge”. Lukashenko also noted that Russia allegedly has “a lot of modern, high-precision weapons”, which are allegedly “enough to destroy the entire energy infrastructure of Ukraine” [7]. That is, the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” was declared by the Kremlin as an “indulgence” for the destruction of the infrastructure of peaceful Ukrainian cities on the eve of winter.
These terrorist acts of the aggressor “creatively developed” the declared goals of the criminal “special operation” of the Kremlin – namely, fake “demilitarization and denazification”. In fact, we are talking about the genocide of the Ukrainian people, because what else can you call the purposeful abandonment of people in the winter without light, heating, and in some places even water. This terrorist goal of the aggressor fully explains why the Russian punishers “quickly found out everything” and “appointed the guilty” [8].
But immediately after the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge”, the Russian aggressors not only began to criminally destroy the energy infrastructure, but also resolved several more “important” criminal issues. Russia criminally introduced “martial law” in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which in turn somewhat simplified the “partial mobilization” in the Crimea. The aggressor limited the outflow of the population from the occupied peninsula under the pretext of the “emergency condition of the bridge” and created new propaganda fakes to “justify” the criminal aggression.
The consistency and coherence of the rhetoric of the Russian authorities and the Crimean collaborators also testify in favor of the terrorist attack planned by the Kremlin. At first, Putin accused Ukraine of alleged “terrorism against Russia”, and a little later, the Russian special services put forward a “clear” and obviously pre-prepared “version” [9]. The Crimean traitors, who began to rebroadcast the Kremlin’s opinion with one voice, were not left behind.
The first to “stand out” was Serhii Aksyonov, who, in particular, complained that after the explosion “most tourists canceled their hotel reservations” and decided not to visit the occupied peninsula after all [10]. Volodymyr Kostiantynov also habitually blamed Ukraine and issued a standard set of threats. Such a reaction shows, among other things, the fear of the Crimean collaborators, because they see that the Kremlin will stop at nothing to achieve its goals. Panic moods after the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” mainly affected the Russian “colonizers” on the occupied peninsula.
According to insiders, fuel shortages occurred almost immediately on the peninsula, particularly due to the panicked mood of the Russian “colonizers” [11]. Even pro-Russian bloggers in the Crimea began to criticize the Russian authorities and special services and spread the idea that the explosions could happen again [12].
After the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge”, top Russian propagandists systematically and organizedly covered the beginning of criminal mass rocket attacks on the energy infrastructure of Ukraine – as if this is a “response to the blowing up of the bridge” across the Kerch Strait. Traditionally, the propagandists of the aggressor talked about “damaging military facilities” and decision-making centers [13]. Although in reality, the occupiers’ targets were power plants, power grids and other objects that provide light and heat to the homes of ordinary Ukrainians, hospitals, kindergartens and maternity homes.
Moreover, after the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge”, Russia sent a list of demands to the UN, in case of non-fulfillment of which it threatened to “withdraw from the agreement on the export of grain from Ukraine through the Black Sea”, which expires in November. Moreover, the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” was presented as “one of the reasons for withdrawing from the agreement” [14]. It is obvious that Russia in this way lobbied for the removal of sanctions on the export of Russian grain and goods, which was later reflected in the events of October 28-31 after the explosions in the occupied Sevastopol.
It is necessary to pay attention that the authorities of the aggressor decided to “make extra money” on the “repair of the Crimean bridge”. Thus, the Russian government has identified a single contractor who must carry out repair work by “July 2023”, and “Nizhneangarsktransstroy” became this contractor [15]. The company with that name from Buryatia was once headed by a certain Veniamin Leshukov, and it was liquidated back in 2016.
The question immediately arises as to why the Crimean collaborators did not lobby for the interests of their own “companies”, since it is a question of a significant amount of the contract. According to experts, there are several explanations for this situation. First of all, we are talking about a rather “tidy piece” that Putin’s entourage is not ready to give to Aksyonov and company. Secondly, the fake “company from Buryatia” can be used to reduce sanctions risks, because to restore the bridge, it is necessary to import sanctioned materials. Thirdly, carrying out the works is a potentially risky matter, since the possibility is not excluded that Ukraine will actually decide to attack the Crimean bridge if necessary [16].
It is very interesting why Putin did not entrust the “restoration of the bridge” to his “oligarch friend” Arkadiy Rotenberg, but chose another “contractor”, considering that Rotenberg was a “contractor” on the construction of the bridge. At the same time, several construction companies were registered under the mentioned Veniamin Leshukov, some of which also ceased their activities [17].
With a high probability, this may indicate an “interesting relationship” between Putin and Rotenberg, who was left without a very “beneficial contract”. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the war with Ukraine, as a result of which the sanctioned Russian oligarchs bear billions in losses every month.
Meanwhile, the Crimean collaborators continue to create a picture for the Russian media. Local pro-Russian telegram channels report on the “inspection of repair works” by Serhiy Aksyonov and Serhiy Kiriyenko, currently the deputy head of the administration of the Russian president.
Collaborators constantly talk about allegedly “increasing the pace of work, bringing in metal structures and floating cranes”. However, it is clear to the observer that the Kremlin is not too concerned about the bridge. High-ranking officials are only interested in “kickbacks”, which can amount to more than 70% of the total amount of the contract.
Thus, the explosion on the “Crimean Bridge” became beneficial not only to the Russian aggression machine, which after it showed the true purpose of this performance, but also to a number of beneficiaries close to the Kremlin.
It is noteworthy that Ukraine takes a measured and adequate approach to all accusations of alleged “terrorism” by the aggressor state. In particular, Oleksiy Danilov, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, stated that the “Crimean Bridge” is a “self-build construction” on Ukrainian territory, which Russia must remove at its own expense, because this is stipulated by Ukrainian legislation [18]. The world has long distrusted the Russian aggressors and has learned to distinguish truth from lies, as evidenced by the numerous sanctions and isolation of the real terrorist state.
Sources:
- https://suspilne.media/293116-krimskij-mist-fsb-rosii-zvinuvacue-gur-i-budanova-u-pidrivi-mostu/
- https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63185400
- https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/3594295-vorog-ne-zdatnij-perekidati-rezervi-cerez-krimskij-mist-gumenuk.html
- https://tsn.ua/svit/na-kerchenskomu-mostu-znachno-posilili-perevirku-avto-ta-pasazhiriv-yak-v-aeroportu-2182426.html
- https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/10/14/novyna/suspilstvo/rosiya-rozraxovuye-vidremontuvaty-krymskyj-mist-lypnya-dokument
- https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/10/12/7371633/
- https://thepage.ua/ua/news/rosiya-atakuvala-ukrayinu-10-zhovtnya-cherez-vibuh-na-mostu-v-krimu
- https://mind.ua/openmind/20247958-podarunok-dlya-putina-hto-pidirvav-krimskij-mist
- https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/10/9/7371039
- https://www.unian.net/war/vzryv-na-krymskom-mostu-aksenov-zayavil-ob-obrushenii-dvuh-proletov-12003840.html
- https://24tv.ua/rosiyani-shturmuyut-magazini-krimski-tatari-radiyut-yak-krimu_n2173898
- https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/krym-kerchenskyi-mist-vybukh-naslidky/32082233.html
- https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/vygaduyuchy-peremogu-yak-rosijska-propaganda-pereklala-vidpovidalnist-za-masovanyj-udar-po-ukrayini-i48368
- https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2022/10/13/692604/
- https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/532983-vlasti-rf-hotyat-vosstanovit-krymskiy-most-k-letu-2023-goda
- https://uatv.ua/osobogo-rveniya-vosstanavlivat-krymskij-most-u-okkupantov-ne-budet-prichiny-nazval-ekspert-video/
- https://ghall.com.ua/2022/10/14/putin-ne-doveril-vosstanavlivat-krymskij-most-drugu-oligarhu/
- https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/danilov-krimskiy-mist-tse-samobud-kiy-rosiya-1665738015.html
