Amid the ongoing logistical and energy crisis on the occupied peninsula, the group of “speaker” Vladimir Konstantinov, which the Kremlin “authorized” to “prepare for the September Duma elections,” by early August had adopted a position of “cautious criticism” of Crimean gauleiter Sergei Aksyonov and shifting responsibility for the current situation onto him.
According to this group’s plan, the main “bearers of truth” should be “local deputies” who “cannot bring voters electricity in their pockets,” but who will preach to them about the “Kyiv junta,” the “national leader,” and personnel reasons for “isolated power outages at the local level.”
Amid rumors of Aksyonov’s “imminent resignation before the elections” and Konstantinov’s periodic meetings with various Kremlin beneficiaries of the “autumn changes,” this “reliable plan” has developed a rather remarkable “Achilles heel.”
Both the “deputies” from Konstantinov’s vast “chessboard” and other “local officials” have refused to make public appearances en masse, and over the course of a month of crisis, it can be argued that their “door-to-door” approach has been thwarted, with the dissemination of hundreds of fake photo reports of “work completed” on “local official resources.”
And the “speaker’s” demand for “strengthening patriotic activity at the local level” has led to tragicomic results: “suddenly” held “exhibitions” and “festivals” in district centers in Northern Crimea, where communications, electricity, water, and fuel have been extremely difficult for a month, have provoked a rather predictable reaction from the population.
Meanwhile, Konstantinov’s described tactics, “strangely enough,” failed to inspire his Kremlin handlers by August: no one in Moscow is stopping the fake “speaker” from daily denouncement of “decaying Europe” and Volodymyr Zelensky, and insisting that “Kyiv has no concrete plans to reclaim Crimea.”
However, the Kremlin would like to see some kind of “anti-crisis action plan” from the “speaker,” including personnel and management components, slightly broader than initiatives to rename streets and promote a shell-shocked disabled man from Alushta as a “new Crimean politician.”
In this situation, the chances that Moscow will “mature” for an “anti-corruption” replacement for Aksyonov before the September “election show” are quite slim, and after that, the population of the occupied peninsula will certainly have no time for any “personnel changes.”
