Since the end of 2025, a systemic digital transformation of the communications infrastructure has been observed in the Russian Federation and at the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea.
This has been accompanied by attempts to displace independent and foreign messengers (Telegram, WhatsApp) while simultaneously promoting the Russian MAX platform (an aggregator-cum-superapp for messaging, government services, and other online services).
At the same time, the occupiers’ aggressive policy of accelerating the mass adoption of MAX combines elements of technological and psychological pressure.
Associate Professor Andriy Chvalyuk, specially for our Association, explored how the occupiers are attempting to completely control the private communications of the peninsula’s residents.
Starting in August 2025, Crimean residents began reporting partial restrictions on the popular messengers Telegram and WhatsApp, which hinders stable messaging and voice communications.
“Roskomnadzor” claims that the call restrictions were supposedly introduced to “protect citizens from fraud and recruitment.” Other official agencies of the aggressor deny outright blocking of these services, but data from providers and telecom sources indicate reduced availability and functional limitations in the region.
Meanwhile, “local authorities” created by the occupiers persistently and constantly “recommend” switching to MAX as a supposedly safe “alternative” where “channels of the peninsula’s state and media resources are allegedly accessible.”
Experts report that this is a scheme already tested by the aggressor authorities, previously used against YouTube: the service is not formally blocked, but its performance is artificially slowed.
As a result, users experience constant outages and deteriorating connection quality, which eventually pushes them to seek alternative platforms.
In the previous phase, RuTube and VK Video were deliberately promoted as such alternatives. MAX is now being offered in a similar manner, positioned as a service that “works everywhere,” primarily for an audience that does not prioritize security and privacy of communications.
It’s worth noting that Roskomnadzor began imposing restrictive measures against WhatsApp (owned by Meta, a corporation recognized as “extremist” in Russia) on December 19, 2024, threatening a “complete block” if the messenger “fails to comply with Russian legislation on combating crime and terrorism.”
WhatsApp’s management was undeterred by the threats and stated that the Russian authorities’ actions were aimed at depriving the population of the right to private, secure communication and that the company would fight for its users.
The MAX promotion strategy goes far beyond classic marketing and is systemic and legally backed.
Starting September 1, 2025, the Russian government has required manufacturers to pre-install the messenger on all smartphones, tablets, and other devices sold within the country, as well as in occupied territories, including Crimea.
This decision fits into the broader concept of the so-called “digital sovereignty” of Russia and is accompanied by an expansion of mandatory infrastructure requirements.
Specifically, similar regulations apply to the Russian app store RuStore, which is pre-installed on all Android devices in the country and, as of September 1, became mandatory for use on Apple devices sold in Russia.
In practice, this means that devices are shipped with the platform already installed, which is not always possible to remove using standard tools.
As technical analysis and expert assessments show, pre-installed apps can have privileged access and be embedded in the system environment, making them difficult to remove and increasing user dependence on the service.
According to Ukrainian authorities, the MAX app has full access to the microphone, camera, contacts, geolocation, and files. It cannot be disabled using standard tools; it uses root access and system jar files —signs of malware. Data is automatically transferred to servers associated with VK, which are controlled by Russian intelligence agencies.
Furthermore, MAX can be used to send summonses to residents of the occupied territories — for court or military service — making the messenger a tool for official notifications and additional pressure from the occupation forces.
Several analytical publications by the Crimean Tatar Resource Center indicate that MAX is used not only for communication but also to centralize information and strengthen digital control over users.
The messenger’s official documentation and distribution terms emphasize that user data (geolocations, contacts, activity history) may be transferred to government agencies, and that end-to-end encryption, typical of Telegram or WhatsApp, is not available.
The aggregate data collected and processed by MAX poses a critically high level of risk for residents of Ukraine’s occupied territories.
This is not a fragmented collection of technical information, but rather the creation of a comprehensive digital user profile that integrates information about location, social connections, behavioral patterns, media preferences, and the content of personal communications.
Under occupation, this architecture turns MAX into a system control tool. Access to IP addresses and precise geolocation allows tracking user movements and correlating them with their physical presence in specific locations.
Phone book contacts and activity data make it possible to identify horizontal connections, form social networks, and identify potentially “disloyal” groups.
Analysis of clipboards, files, and media content expands the possibilities for contextual monitoring of private life, including political views, sources of information, and forms of expression.
MAX’s integration with state digital ecosystems and the RuStore infrastructure poses a particular threat, eliminating even formal barriers between user data and security or intelligence agencies.
As a result, any digital action (message, channel view, saved file, or contact) can be interpreted as grounds for pressure, harassment, or repressive measures.
Thus, using MAX in occupied territories poses not only privacy risks but also direct threats to personal safety.
The app effectively creates conditions for preventive surveillance, digital identification, and subsequent offline persecution of the population, making it a particularly dangerous tool in the context of occupation control.
Numerous technical analyses commissioned by “Forbes” indicate that the MAX app was apparently designed from the outset as a tool for user surveillance.
Digital security experts emphasize that MAX has significant potential for total monitoring, as all user information and communications are stored on government servers and can be accessed by intelligence agencies in real time.
Additional risks include the possibility of data leaks and fraudulent activity, especially given the planned integration of sensitive information into the application, including payment and banking details, and digital signature keys.
This architecture creates an environment of heightened control and vulnerability, which is particularly dangerous in occupied territories, where the collected data can be used by the authorities of the aggressor country to analyze and control the behavior of the population.
On June 4, 2025, the Kremlin dictator ordered the federal government to “purposefully organize work” to support the MAX system. On June 18, Yevgeny Naumov, head of the Krasnodar Krai administration, announced the city authorities’ transition to the MAX system, and the next day, Maxim Kudryavtsev, mayor of Novosibirsk, made a “similar decision.”
At the end of July, the Russian Ministry of digital development recommended that governors, members of regional governments, senators, members of parliament, mayors, and other officials install and use MAX for work.
Crimean gauleiter Sergey Aksyonov launched his MAX channel on the messenger app on August 20, 2025. Following this, representatives of the Crimean occupation “administration” began directing education and “government” employees to use MAX specifically for “official communications and administrative tasks.”
On November 10, 2025, the Russian Ministry of science and higher education sent a letter to higher and secondary specialized educational institutions setting a deadline of November 12 for “registering the organization in the national MAX messenger and completing a survey on its current level of use within the organization.”
By November 17, educational institutions were required to ensure the creation of “academic group chats and official organizational channels in the national MAX messenger.”
The ministry’s document does not directly mention sanctions or threats against those who refuse to install MAX on their phones or join such chats. However, installing the app is clearly linked to the Russian government’s experiment with digitalizing student ID cards and record books, making it physically impossible to study without the new messenger.
As human rights groups note, forcing universities to install MAX violates three articles of the Russian Constitution and the aggressor’s laws on education and labor, but Russian authorities are unconcerned.
The so-called “Ministry of Education” of the occupiers in Crimea also ordered school chats for parents to be switched to MAX, and its own “employees” to completely refrain from using other messengers. MAX has already become a key channel for disseminating the aggressor’s “official information”: it publishes messages from so-called “authorities,” controlled media outlets, and Kremlin news agencies, which specifically demand that residents of the peninsula “receive news and administrative announcements through this platform.”
In particular, the “state media” “Krym-24” announced the launch of its own channel on this platform, positioning it as a tool for “prompt information” and a way to “stay informed.”
This institutional integration aims to maximize MAX’s position in the peninsula’s information space and creates the effect of concentrating communications within the state-controlled digital space of the aggressor country, significantly narrowing the space for alternative sources of information.
It is possible that access to the “Gosklyuch” app for the aggressor-controlled population could also be further restricted and implemented exclusively through MAX.
Many human rights organizations and independent analysts link the widespread deployment of MAX in the occupied territories to increased control over the population’s communications.
In particular, experts point out that the centralized structure, lack of strong encryption, and connection to state servers create conditions for monitoring correspondence and metadata, increasing the risks for activists, journalists, and anyone seeking to maintain the privacy of their communications.
Human rights activists also emphasize that such measures could exacerbate repressive practices against pro-Ukrainian or critical populations, as digital traces become available for analysis and potential use against civil society activists.
Formally, the MAX project is positioned as a “commercial development without direct budget funding,” and the aggressor’s federal budget does not specifically allocate funds for the creation or development of the MAX messenger.
At the same time, the Kremlin dictator has explicitly instructed the government to develop additional measures to support the development of the “national messenger” by August 2025, effectively cementing MAX’s special status in the aggressor’s state digital policy.
VK Group’s press releases, however, formulate their support more vaguely, stating that the platform is allegedly being developed “with the support of the Ministry of digital development and Rostec ecosystem companies,” but without disclosing specific funding mechanisms or amounts.
Independent sources point to “systemic non-financial state support.” This includes the creation of a favorable regulatory environment, infrastructure preferences, and administrative promotion.
Such measures include, in particular, mandatory pre-installation of MAX on devices starting September 1, 2025, as well as information support for the project in government and near-government channels.
Media reports often focus not on financial injections but on political impetus—against the backdrop of blocking or ousting alternative messaging apps and informal pressure on public institutions.
Forbes, citing sources in the investment community, noted that VK “plans to share the costs of MAX development with partners, using existing ecosystem resources.”
A separate element of state support is the involvement of the education system: Russian schools have been instructed to discuss the MAX messenger with children as part of the mandatory “Conversations on important” series, which is used to broadcast Kremlin-approved narratives. This indicates institutional promotion of the product that goes far beyond mere market marketing.
Formally, MAX development is being carried out by VK Group, including through its subsidiary, “Communication Platform”, with a charter capital of 100 million rubles. However, its financial performance appears extremely modest: in 2024, the company’s revenue was only 2.3 million rubles.
Against this backdrop, it is clear that the actual volume of work and expenses on MAX is being covered not by a separate project company, but by the entire VK ecosystem.
In June 2025, VK conducted an additional share issue, raising approximately 112 billion rubles, primarily to reduce its debt burden. This demonstrates the holding company’s strained financial situation and indirectly confirms the thesis that MAX is not a project with a separate, large investment budget.
Experts point out that VK’s financial capabilities in 2022–2024 were limited by growing net debt and a series of additional share issues, so separate capital injections specifically for MAX were not publicized. “Forbes” reported that VK is focusing on leveraging existing capabilities and consolidating the functionality of previous services under a single brand.
This approach is indirectly supported by technical analysis. An examination of the MAX APK-file revealed elements that directly reference components of TamTam, one of VK’s previous messengers. Furthermore, MAX’s architecture relies on the existing VK Messenger stack: backend services, authentication mechanisms, server infrastructure, and messaging modules.
As a result, MAX appears not as a product created from scratch, but as a reworking and rebranding of VK’s accumulated solutions. In this context, even potential government spending, if any, could have been “dissolved” in the wording about developing a new messenger, making it difficult to track.
Essentially, MAX is an internal VK project, implemented under a government mandate and administratively favored by the aggressor, rather than an initiative of independent private foundations.
VK and government agencies have not published data on MAX advertising costs.
Open sources only provide information about actual campaigns: in particular, “Forbes” recorded the launch of MAX advertising in VK Stories in the summer of 2025.
Market estimates are forecasts. Analysts have reported that the advertising volume within MAX could reach 500-600 million rubles by the end of 2025.
This isn’t about VK’s expenses, but about the potential size of the advertising market within the app itself (channels, bots, placements).
Overall, the media characterize MAX’s promotion as aggressive and multi-channel: television, social media, educational institutions, as well as celebrity content and children’s formats.
However, no full-fledged journalistic investigations specifically devoted to MAX’s advertising budgets have been published to date.
Elena Bagudina, the CEO of Communications Platform, the formal developer of MAX, holds a managerial rather than technical role, and her age (71) has become the subject of ironic discussions on social media. However, beyond the symbolic effect, she has not been the subject of any real scandals or accusations.
Stepan Kovalchuk, VK’s Senior Vice-President for media strategy and service development, who is considered one of the key overseers of MAX, is the son of media manager Kirill Kovalchuk and the grandson of Mikhail Kovalchuk, director of the Kurchatov Institute and a longtime ally of the Kremlin dictator.
Vladimir Kiriyenko, VK’s CEO since December 2021, strategically oversees the launch of MAX. He is the son of Sergei Kiriyenko, one of the key political administrators of the current Kremlin regime.
Therefore, the mass deployment of the MAX messenger in the occupied territories of Ukraine is not a neutral technological process or the result of market competition.
It is a systemic and targeted policy aimed at redistributing the population’s private and official communications into a digital space controlled by the aggressor country.
A combination of regulatory decisions, administrative directives, and coercive practices—from the translation of school and work chats to the use of MAX as a channel for official information—creates a virtual lack of alternatives to this platform in everyday life.
Under these conditions, using MAX becomes not a user choice, but an element of an imposed governance infrastructure.
The application’s technical features, including centralized data storage, the lack of transparent communications security mechanisms, and integration with government services, significantly increase the risks of total surveillance.
For residents of the occupied territories, this means increased vulnerability to repressive practices: from the analysis of social connections and digital behavior to the use of online activity as grounds for repressive persecution.
As a result, MAX should be viewed not simply as a means of communication, but as an element of a broader system of digital control integrated into the policies of the occupation government.
Its proliferation increases the population’s dependence on the aggressor country’s infrastructure and narrows the space for secure private communication, which has direct negative consequences for basic human rights in the occupied territories.
